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Abstract
This study analyses the communication of the five major categories of risk (business, strategy,
market and credit risk disclosure) over the volatile 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) time
period in key South East Asian countries’ manufacturing listed companies. This study is important
as it contributes to the literature by providing insights into the voluntary risk disclosure practices
using sample countries with different economic scenarios. Key findings are that business risk is the
most disclosed category and strategy risk is the least disclosed. Business and credit risk disclosure
consistently increase over the three year period, while operating, market and strategy risk disclosure
increase in 2008, but then decrease slightly in 2009. Statistical analysis reveals that country of
incorporation and size help predict risk disclosure levels. The overall low disclosure levels (2629%) highlight the potential for far higher communication of key risk factors.
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Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 represents the most serious slowdown the world economy has
experienced since the Great Depression (Loser 2009). The collapse of a global housing bubble,
which peaked in the United States (U.S.) in 2006, caused the value of securities tied to real estate
pricing to plummet, thereafter damaging financial institutions globally (Kenc and Dibooglu 2009).
Mishkin (2011) states that the financial crisis of 2007-2009 can be divided into two different phases
in the U.S. The first phase is from August 2007 to August 2008 with major losses in the U.S.
financial sub-prime residential mortgages. Although this troubled the U.S. financial markets, real
GDP in the U.S. continued to rise into the second quarter of 2008, but in mid-September 2008 the
financial crisis entered the more serious phase. Key events were: the investment bank Lehman
Brothers entered bankruptcy on 15 September 2008; the insurance firm AIG collapsed on 16
September 2008; there was a run on the Reserve Primary Fund money market fund on the same
day; and the U.S. government began to publicise the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
(Mishkin 2011). What started as a credit crunch in July 2007 in the U.S. spread to other countries
and brought the global financial system to a perceived large-scale crisis. While the crisis quickly
resulted in a deep recession in a number of advanced economies, the emerging markets and
developing economies were also seriously affected, but the impact varied across regions and
countries (Kenc and Dibooglu 2009). Economies worldwide slowed during this period as credit
tightened and international trade declined (Claessens et al. 2010).
This study examines the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 on the
key sub-categories of risk disclosure via a longitudinal dataset of listed manufacturing companies in
180 annual reports in four countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia). An
examination of the manufacturing sector is important as the value added to the GDP from this sector
in these countries is high (Australia 29%, Indonesia 47%, Malaysia 55% and Singapore 26%),
based on the database from the World Bank (2011). 2007 is the first true year of the global financial
crisis, 2008 is arguably the worst year, and 2009 is the year of early crisis recovery (IMF 2009).
This study is important as it helps us judge the impact of the GFC and other key factors upon the
extent of risk disclosures in this weak economic timeframe. The primary research questions of this
study are to explain the extent of risk disclosure in five key major categories (business, strategy,
market and credit risk disclosure), and to explore the predictors of such communication.
Risk reporting and disclosures are becoming a greater concern of international accounting
standard-setters (Cabedo and Tirado 2004; Atan and Maruhun 2009). For example, the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB 2008) under IAS 1: Presentation of Financial Statement and
IAS 32: Financial Instruments: Presentation requires companies to provide information on
principal uncertainties faced and disclosures of information for some specific risks.3 IFRS 7
regulates financial instrument: disclosures. Further, the Financial Accounting Standard Board
(FASB 1998), under SFAC No. 133 establishes compulsory disclosures of market risks arising from
the use of financial assets. However, as the vast majority of (non-bank) risk disclosures remain
purely voluntary in contemporary times, this paper focuses exclusively on voluntary risk disclosure.
Hill and Short (2009) suggest that risk disclosures will reduce information asymmetry for
firms. The concept of asymmetry between management (agents) and investors (principals) is that
some information will be given but some will be withheld. A reduction in information asymmetry
leads to lower monitoring costs between agents and principals (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Agents
are assumed to have incentives to disclose information voluntarily, mainly driven by rational
agents’ self-interest regarding their reputation and remuneration (Healy and Palepu 2001).
Disclosures can reduce agency costs by minimising the capacity of managers to adjust disclosure
3

IAS 1 requires companies to disclose: financial risk management objectives and policies; management's judgements in
determining when substantially all the significant risks and rewards of ownership of financial assets and lease assets are
transferred to other entities; and information about the key assumptions concerning the future, and other key sources of
estimation uncertainty at the end of the reporting period that have a significant risk of causing a material adjustment to
the carrying amounts of assets and liabilities within the next financial year (IASB 2008).
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data (Marshall and Weetman 2002). In addition, disclosures can reduce estimation risk to better
avoid market failure and increase market liquidity leading to more efficient capital markets (Healy
and Palepu 2001).
A better level of risk communication allows capital market participants to be aware of
potential material changes, and in doing so, these disclosures can reduce agency costs. Arguably,
the disclosure of information about risk will improve stakeholder understanding: the company
(using internal data) can directly communicate the various risks it faces. This higher level of
transparency will greatly ease the task of interpreting the risks of the company by external users
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Cabedo and Tirado 2004; Marshall and Weetman 2002; Taylor 2008).
Literature Review
Risk can be defined as the uncertainty associated with both potential gain and loss (Solomon et al.
2000), or as the difference between the actualities and the expected (Remenyi and Heafield 1996).
These values reflect the magnitude of the risk. Linsley and Shrives (2006, , p.389) more specifically
define risk disclosures as “any information disclosing to reader on any opportunities, prospect,
hazard, harm, thread or exposure that have already impacted or may give an impact upon the
company or management in future”. For comparison, finance textbooks typically define ‘risk’ as a
set of outcomes arising from a decision that can be assigned probabilities whereas ‘uncertainty’
arises when probabilities cannot be assigned to the set of outcomes (Linsley and Shrives 2006).
These broad definitions of risk are adopted in this study because they comprehensively embrace
‘risks’ and ‘uncertainties’.
There are five major sub-categories for risk: ‘business’, ‘strategy’, ‘operating’, ‘market’ and
‘credit’ risks (Dhaliwal et al. 1983; Jorion 2000; Cabedo and Tirado 2004). Business risk is what
firms willingly assume to create a competitive advantage and add value for shareholders. Business
risk is symmetrical with both gains and losses for firms (Cabedo and Tirado 2004). Amit and
Wernerfelt (1990) state that business risk does or should matter in strategy making due to the dual
need of managers to satisfy multiple stakeholders: both as shareholders themselves and to other
stakeholders (such as employees, suppliers, and surrounding community).
Strategy risk is associated with basic changes in the economy. The evolution of the
economic environment generates a high level of structural economic uncertainty which affects
firms’ performance. Firms should therefore communicate how they are affected by changes in the
economy and how sensitive the firm is to changes in these factors (Cabedo and Tirado 2004).
Operating risk arises from the risk inherent in the investment and production decisions of the
firm (Dhaliwal et al. 1983). Cabedo and Tirado (2004) define operating risk as the risk of direct or
indirect losses resulting from internal process errors, personnel or systems errors or from external
factors faced by the firm.
Market risk can be defined as risk resulting from a variation in the price of certain economic
goods (Cabedo and Tirado 2004). Hence, market risk arises from movements in the level or
volatility of market prices (Jorion 2000).
Credit risk can be defined as the possibility that over time, a decrease in the real value of a
firm’s client portfolio may occur as a result of credit quality decadence suffered by those making up
the portfolio (Cabedo and Tirado 2004).
The communication of the five major sub-categories of voluntary risk disclosures is
important to provide a fundamentally better understanding of risk exposure. Higher levels of
transparency will help shareholders to better understand the risks of the company (Cabedo and
Tirado 2004). In addition, better disclosure can lessen the chance of market failure and increase
market liquidity leading to more efficient capital markets (Healy and Palepu 2001).
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Accounting Regulation
The principal sources of accounting standards in the four countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore
and Australia) are virtually identical due to the international convergence with the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Astami and Tower 2006). IFRS refers to the entire body of
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) rules, approved by the IASB, IAS, the Standing
Interpretation Committee (SIC), and its predecessor the International Accounting Standards
Committee (IASC) (Astami and Tower 2006).
In the past, Indonesian accounting standards were adopted from U.S. accounting standards
issued by AICPA (Craig and Diga 1996), but now, with the IFRS regulation, Indonesian companies
are in the convergence process ongoing. A final decision about the ultimate target date for full
compliance with IFRS is expected to be made in 2012 (IFRS 2011). In Indonesia, the standard
setting body is Komite Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (Committee on Financial Accounting
Standards) and there are additional disclosure requirements imposed by the Capital Market
Supervisory Board (Bapepam) for listed companies (Astami and Tower 2006). Malaysian and
Singaporean accounting standards are more centrally-based on accounting pronouncements of the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In Australia, there are required IFRS rules for all
reporting entities reporting since 2005 (IFRS 2011). In summary, each of the four sample countries
have implemented or are moving quickly towards full IFRS adoption.
Hypothesis Development
Prior studies document the effect of country on disclosure practice. Dye (1985), in his analytical
model, suggests that voluntary communication is affected by the disclosure requirements of the
accounting regime. Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) find that country/region is one of the factors
explaining the extent of voluntary disclosure. Williams and Tower (1998) examine the preferred
level of disclosure in the issue of differential reporting in Singaporean and Australian small
business entities, and note that small company managers in these two countries differ in their
acceptance of international standards requiring higher disclosure requirements than existing
domestic standards. Tower, Hancock and Taplin (1999) find that the country of reporting is the
main significant factor for the level of IAS compliance in the Asia-Pacific region. Soewarso et al.
(2003) also conclude that the country of incorporation is the main determinant of Australian and
Singaporean disclosure practice differences. Australian companies communicate significantly more
information relative to their Singaporean counterparts. Bailey, Karolyi & Salva (2006) examine the
increased disclosure for non-U.S. firms when listing shares in the U.S. and conclude that the county
factor is an important determinant of increased disclosure. They note that the greatest increases are
for firms from developed countries. Marshall and Weetman (2002) in a two-country comparison
between the U.S. and the U.K. state that risk disclosure regulations drawn up at similar times can
have a different impact in two different regulatory environments. Based on the above literature
review, this paper posits country as the determinant factor explaining the association between risk
disclosures. Thus, it is hypothesised that:

H1 : There is an association between country of incorporation and risk disclosures in the annual
reports in listed manufacturing companies.

Many prior studies (e.g., Atan and Maruhun 2009) document the significant effect of
company size on disclosure practices. The level of risk information disclosures is thought to be
positively associated with size (Kanto and Schadewitz 1997). Regarding the quantity of risk
disclosure, Beretta and Bozzoland (2004) examine the annual reports of non-financial companies
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listed on the Italian Stock Exchange and also note a relationship with size. Similarly, Linsley and
Shrives (2009) explore the association between the number of risk disclosures and company size.
These studies support the hypothesis that a positive correlation exists between the volume of risk
disclosures and company size. Consistent with agency theory tenets, this paper adopts company size
as a potential factor explaining the positive association between risk disclosures by proposing a
directional hypothesis:

H2: There is a positive association between company size and risk disclosures in the annual reports
of listed manufacturing companies.

Several prior studies document the significant effect of managerial ownership on disclosure
practices. Gerb (2000) examines the effect of managerial ownership on firms’ disclosures and finds
firms with lower levels of managerial ownership are more likely communicators of risk disclosures
than firms with higher levels of managerial ownership. Eng and Mak (2003) also note a negative
relationship between managerial ownership and increased disclosure. That is, based on agency
theory, managers have greater incentives to consume perks and reduced incentives to maximise job
performance. Thus, lower managerial ownership is associated with increased voluntary disclosure.
Consistent with the results of most past studies which note a negative relationship between
managerial ownership and the level of disclosure (Gerb 2000; Eng and Mak 2003), this paper
advances managerial ownership as a potential factor explaining the negative association with risk
disclosures by proposing a directional hypothesis:

H3: There is a negative association between managerial ownership and risk disclosures in the
annual reports in listed manufacturing companies.

Prior studies document a significant effect of board independence on disclosure practices.
For instance Baek, Johnson and Kim (2009) conclude that firms with a higher percentage of outside
directors are more likely to disclose board and management process information, but not other types
of discretionary information. Moreover, Chen and Jaggi (2000) note a positive association between
the proportion of independent non-executive directors (INDs) on corporate boards of Hong Kong
firms and the comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. Most studies thus conclude that INDs on
corporate boards have a positive influence on management decisions to disclose financial
information. Garcia-Meca and Sanches-Ballesta (2010) find a positive association between board
independence and voluntary disclosures primarily in the countries with high investor protection
rights. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) state that boards with a larger proportion of INDs (proxy for
board-monitoring effectiveness) are significantly and positively associated with higher levels of
voluntary disclosure. Beretta and Bozzoland (2004) note that different types of board directors fulfil
different functions, with both the number of executive and the number of independent directors
positively related to the level of corporate risk reporting. In summary, the results of most past
agency theory studies establish a positive relationship between board independence and the level of
disclosure (Baek et al. 2009; Chen and Jaggi 2000; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Beretta and
Bozzoland 2004; Garcia-Meca and Sanches-Ballesta 2010). Accordingly, this paper adopts the level
of board independence as a potential factor explaining a positive association with risk disclosures
by proposing a directional hypothesis:

H4: There is a positive association between higher levels of board independence and risk
disclosures in the annual reports of listed manufacturing companies.
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This study also examines age of business, auditor, leverage and profitability as control
variables to be included in the statistical analysis. These control variables are consistent with those
used in prior research to add further insight (Solomon et al. 2000; Atan and Maruhun 2009;
Homölle 2009; Marshall and Weetman 2002; Abraham and Cox 2007; Morrison 1993; SinclairDesgagné and Gozlan 2003; Ahmed et al. 2004; Dhaliwal et al. 1983; Cabedo and Tirado 2004;
Thornton 2004; Makhija and Patton 2004; Linsley and Shrives 2009; Bremer and Pettway 2002;
Lee et al. 2003; Akhigbe and Martin 2008; Xifra and Ordeix 2009).
Research Approach
A total of 180 firm years data are collected consisting of a random sample of 60 manufacturing4
listed companies’ annual reports for fiscal year-ends from 2007 to 2009. The reports include 15
annual reports of manufacturing companies per country, listed in the stock exchanges of Australia,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore for this key three year GFC time period.
This research adopts a researcher-constructed Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) to create an
index measuring the extent of risk disclosure by listed firms. In the initial stage, an extensive review
of prior studies is undertaken to check for commonalities across the studies and to identify items
that are linked with risk disclosures. The use of a disclosure index to measure the extent of
disclosure can be traced to the work of: Solomon et al. (2000); Linsley and Shrives (2006), who
synthesise The Turnbull Report; Suhardjanto (2008), who applied The Global Report Initiative
(GRI); and Akhigbe and Martin (2008), who used the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a benchmark to gouge
the extent of disclosure. The Voluntary Disclosure Checklist (VDC) of Gray, Meek and Roberts
(1995) and the Voluntary Disclosure Instrument (VDIS) of Ho (2009) are also used in this study to
derive the benchmark disclosure checklist.
Consistent with the past literature, an equal weighting/unweighted index approach is used in
scoring the RDI. The index assumes that each item of disclosure is equally important (Gray, Meek
& Roberts 1995). Overall, this simple measurement approach is considered less subjective and
judgmental (Gray, Meek & Roberts 1995).
Since the focus of this research is on voluntary risk disclosures, the preliminary disclosures
checklist is first subjected to a thorough screening in order to ensure that individual items are not
mandatory. This screening of the voluntary risk disclosure checklist is done with reference to the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) mandatory risk disclosure and the mandatory risk
disclosure country’s rules in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia5. The final Risk
disclosure Index (RDI) consists of 34 Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) items.
After establishing the final RDI, a scoring sheet is developed to assess the extent of
voluntary risk disclosure. Consistent with past studies, the item scores one if it is disclosed and zero
if it is not, subject to the applicability of the item concerning the firm.

4

The manufacturing industries in the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 2007 are: food;
beverage and tobacco products; textile mills; textile product mills, apparel; leather and allied products; wood products;
paper; printing and related support activities; petroleum and coal products; chemical, plastics and rubber products; nonmetallic mineral products; primary metal; fabricated metal products; machinery; computer and electronic products;
electrical equipment; appliance and components; transportation equipment; furniture and related products; and
miscellaneous manufacturing.
5

The pilot study examines the possible applicability of mandatory items in IFRS 7, IFRS 9 and IAS 32. It uses
60 annual reports (5 in each country for 2007-2009). The purpose of this pilot study is to ascertain if IFRS 7 mandates
disclosures which impact the RDI in the selected countries. The analysis reveals that some manufacturing companies
have IFRS 7 mandatory disclosures in their annual reports. Eight items from the original 42 item variant of the Risk
Disclosure Index (RDI) are mandatory and are thus removed from the initial Risk Disclosure Index (RDI). This
screening leads to the final selection of the RDI disclosure items.
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The predictor variables are measured as follows: each of the four countries has a ‘country’
variable categorised as dummy; company size is calculated as total assets at the end of the financial
year in U.S. dollars and logged to reduce skewness; managerial ownership is measured by
percentage of managerial ownership; and board independence is the percentage of independent
directors. Leverage is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets, profitability is measured
by net profit divided by total assets, and auditor is categorised as big 4 auditor or not.
Findings
The descriptive statistics for dependent variables in Table 1 shows that overall RDI scores over the
economically-challenging GFC time period averages 28.61%. It rises in 2008 but then falls slightly
with the specific scores ranging from 26.91% in 2007, 29.80% in 2008 and 29.12% in 2009. Table
1 also reveals that business risk disclosure (40.42-42.78%) is the highest sub-category of risk over
time, while strategy risk is consistently far lower (9.79-13.75%).
Table 1
Risk Disclosure Index Categories

Business Risk
Credit Risk
Operating Risk
Market Risk
Strategy Risk
Total Risk Disclosure

Average
41.81%
36.67%
32.22%
19.52%
12.50%
28.61%

2007
40.42%
33.33%
31.00%
18.57%
9.79%
26.91%

2008
42.22%
37.50%
34.33%
21.19%
13.96%
29.80%

2009
42.78%
39.17%
31.33%
18.81%
13.75%
29.12%

Index (RDI)

Figure 1 illustrates that the lowest scores for all risk disclosure sub-categories is in 2007; the
early year of the crisis that affected companies. For operating, market and strategy risk subcategories the highest scores are communicated in 2008, the worst year of the crisis impacting
companies. For business and credit risk, the highest scores are witnessed in 2009, the year of early
crisis recovery. These risk communication categories change over time. Business and credit risk
disclosure consistently increase over the three year period, while operating, market and strategy risk
disclosure increase in 2008, but then decrease slightly in 2009.
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Figure 1
Risk Disclosure Index Categories (2007-2009)

Table 2 shows that the business risk disclosure6 item “Identifying, evaluating and managing
significant risks” has the highest7 level of communication (85%), while “Cost of safety measures” is
the lowest reported item (0.56%). For the strategy risk category, “Specific external factors affecting
company’s prospect” is the highest item (63.33%), while “Risks related to corruption” is the lowest
item (0.56%). For the operating risk category, “Internal control and the extent risk are acceptable” is
the highest item (66.67%), while “Internal control and impact of risks that do materialise” is the
lowest item (24.4%). For the market risk category, “Major exchange rates used in the accounts” is
the highest item (94.4%) and “Effects of inflation on assets – qualitative / quantitative’’ are the
lowest items with no disclosure. There are only two indexes in the credit risk category. Index
“Provide consumer credit business” has a higher value (67.78%) than “Extensions of credit”
(5.56%). Overall, Table 2 reveals vast disparities of communication across the various risk
elements.

6

The correlations between Business Risk Disclosure Index (BRDI), Strategy Risk Disclosure Index (SRDI), Operating
Risk Disclosure Index (ORDI), Market Risk Disclosure Index (MRDI), and Credit Risk Disclosure Index (CRDI) in
2007, 2008 and 2009 (table not included for brevity) reveal that all these variables have positive but not extremely high
correlations. This implies that each risk category has different information content.
7

ANOVA and Post hoc Tukey analysis between five sub-categories of risk (BRDI, SRDI, ORDI, MRDI and CRDI)country shows that in 2007, Australia BRDI is significantly higher than Indonesia, Malaysia ORDI is significantly
higher than all three other countries and Malaysia and Singapore CRDI is significantly higher than Indonesia. For 2008,
Australia BRDI is significantly higher than Indonesia, Indonesia ORDI is significantly lower than all three other
countries, and Indonesia CRDI is significantly lower than all three other countries. In 2009, Australia BRDI is
significantly higher than Indonesia and Indonesia ORDI is significantly lower than all three other countries (tables not
included for brevity).
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Table 2
Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) (2007-2009)
No

Risk Disclosure Items

Average

2007

2008

2009

Trend over time

A.
1.

Total Risk Disclosure Index (RDI)
BUSINESS RISK
Identifying, evaluating and managing significant

28.54%
41.81%
85.00%

26.62%
40.42%
81.67%

29.84%
42.22%
86.67%

29.17%
42.78%
86.67%

Mixed
Rising
Rising

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
B.
13.

risksA
Future prospectsE
Effects of acquisitionE
Effects of disposalsE
Impact of strategyE
Safety policyE
Capital project committedE
Committed expenditure for capital projectsE
Impact of strategy on futureE
Safety of productsE
Data on accidentsE
Cost of safety measuresE
STRATEGY RISK
Specific external factors affecting company’s

77.22%
74.44%
72.78%
64.44%
46.67%
27.22%
15.56%
15.56%
13.33%
8.89%
0.56%
12.50%
63.33%

76.67%
71.67%
75.00%
63.33%
43.33%
23.33%
15.00%
16.67%
10.00%
6.67%
1.67%
9.79%
48.33%

80.00%
78.33%
70.00%
66.67%
48.33%
25.00%
15.00%
13.33%
15.00%
8.33%
0.00%
13.96%
65.00%

75.00%
73.33%
73.33%
63.33%
48.33%
33.33%
16.67%
16.67%
15.00%
11.67%
0.00%
13.75%
76.67%

Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Rising
Large Rise
Rising
Mixed
Rising
Rising
Falling
Mixed
Large Rise

14.
15.
16.
17.

prospectD
Risks and opportunities due to climate changeB
Major regional economic developmentD
Risk-control programs regarding serious diseasesB
Risk for child labour, and elimination of child

12.22%
10.56%
7.22%
2.78%

8.33%
6.67%
6.67%
3.33%

16.67%
15.00%
8.33%
3.33%

11.67%
10.00%
6.67%
1.67%

Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Falling

18.
19.
20.
C.
21.

labourB
Freedom of association riskB
Incidents of forced or compulsory labourB
Risks related to corruptionB
OPERATING RISK
Internal control and the extent risk are acceptableA

1.67%
1.67%
0.56%
32.22%
66.67%

1.67%
1.67%
1.67%
31.00%
63.33%

1.67%
1.67%
0.00%
34.33%
73.33%

1.67%
1.67%
0.00%
31.33%
63.33%

No Change
No Change
Falling
Mixed
Mixed

22.
23.
24.

GAAP risks of the special purpose entityC
Impact accounting policy changesE
Internal control, deliberation include the likelihood

40.56%
28.33%
24.44%

40.00%
30.00%
20.00%

41.67%
26.67%
30.00%

40.00%
28.33%
23.33%

Mixed
Mixed
Mixed

25.

of riskA
Internal control and impact of risks that do

1.11%

1.67%

0.00%

1.67%

Mixed

D.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

materialiseA
MARKET RISK
Major exchange rates used in the accountsE
Effects of inflation on results—qualitative E
Effects of inflation on results—quantitative E
Supplementary inflation adjusted financial
Effects of inflation on future operation—qualitative
Effects of inflation on assets—qualitative E

19.52%
94.44%
26.11%
6.67%
6.67%
2.78%
0.00%

18.57%
95.00%
23.33%
8.33%
3.33%
0.00%
0.00%

21.19%
95.00%
28.33%
8.33%
10.00%
6.67%
0.00%

18.81%
93.33%
26.67%
3.33%
6.67%
1.67%
0.00%

Mixed
Falling
Mixed
Falling
Mixed
Mixed
No Disclosure

32.
E.
33.
34.

Effects of inflation on assets—quantitative E
CREDIT RISK
Provide consumer credit business C
Extensions of creditC

0.00%
36.67%
67.78%
5.56%

0.00%
33.33%
63.33%
3.33%

0.00%
37.50%
70.00%
5.00%

0.00%
39.17%
70.00%
8.33%

No Disclosure
Rising
Rising
Rising

Legend: A = Adapted from Turnbull Report (1999), B = Adapted from Global Report Initiative (GRI) (2006), C = Adapted from Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(2002) SEC 401, D = Adapted from the Voluntary Disclosure Instrument (VDIS), Ho (2009), and E = Adapted from Voluntary Disclosure Checklist
(VDC), Gray, Meek and Roberts (1995).
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Table 3 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables from
the GFC period 2007-2009. Each year represents 60 companies, over the three year period of 20072009 with a total sample of 180 annual report firm years.

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Predictor Variables Year 2007, 2008, 2009
Continuous

2007

2008

2009

2007-2009

LogCompSize (H2)
Size (US$)
ManOwn (H3)
Boardind (H4)
Leverage (CV)
Profit (CV)
AgeofBus (CV)

5.4061
$1,104,000
13.45%
38.73%
47.17%
5.56%
31.2833

5.4620
$1,332,700
12.96%
41.12%
49.09%
-3.55%
32.2833

5.4561
$1,272,600
12.81%
43.55%
53.74%
2.00%
33.2833

5.4414
$1,236,400
13.07%
41.13%
50.00%
1.34%
32.2833

The mean of the company size in the average years is $1,236,400,000 (total assets in U.S.
dollars), increasing in 2008 but then falling slightly in 2009, and ranging from $1,104,000,000 in
2007, $1,332,700,000 in 2008 and $1,272,600,000 in 2009. The lowest managerial ownership is in
2009 (12.81%), having slowly fallen across the three year period, whereas the highest board
independence occurs in 2009 (43.55%) having risen from 38.73% and 41.12% in the earlier two
years. The control variables also change over time. The average company financial leverage is
50.00% ranging from 47.17% to 53.74%. The lowest leverage level occurs in 2007 and it increases
each year. The profitability variable shows more variance as it falls in 2008 from its higher 2007
value and then rises slightly in 2009.
Regression Analysis
Table 4 shows the 2007-2009 regressions8 for Business Risk Disclosure (BRDI), Credit Risk
Disclosure (CRDI), Operating Risk Disclosure (ORDI), Market Risk Disclosure (MRDI) and
Strategy Risk Disclosure (SRDI). This study examines the relationship between the independent
variables (country, company size, managerial ownership and board independence) and control
variables (profitability, leverage and auditor) with each risk category (BRDI, SRDI, ORDI, MRDI
and CRDI). Table 4 illustrates the predictive power of the model from the regression in the 2007,
2008 and 2009. Key explanatory factors for risk disclosure highlighted from Table 4 are:

8

Multiple regression analyses can be severely and adversely affected by failures of the data to remain constant with the
assumptions that customarily accompany regression models. Mahalanobis distance and Cook’s distance as diagnostic
methods are available to help identify certain kinds of failure as outlier data. Diagnostics are thus valuable adjuncts to
regression analyses. Mahalanobis distance and Cook’s distance are capable of producing partial plots in the SPSS
program. This allows for the saving of residuals (Velleman and Welsch 1981). From the residual, Mahalanobis value
should be < 26.52 (based on eight predictor variables), and Cook’s value should be < 1 (Coakes and Steed 2007).
Analysis shows that four companies are potential outliers (for each of their three years), and are thus dropped from the
original 180 annual reports sample resulting in a final sample of 168 annual reports.

52

Probohudono, Tower & Rusmin: Diversity in Risk Communication

•

Over the three GFC years, the ‘country’ variable is the best predictor. It is statistically
significant in 8 of 15 regressions, Australian ‘business risk disclosure’ (BRDI) is consistently
higher than in other countries and Indonesian ‘operating risk’ (ORDI) tends to be lower.

•

Size is a consistent positive predictor for “business risk’ (BRDI) for all years and ‘market
risk’ (MRDI) for 2008 and 2009.

•

There is consistently no evidence to accept the H3 hypothesis that managerial ownership is
related to business risk disclosures. Table 4 shows that managerial ownership is not a
predictor for any risk category in any year. Moreover, managerial ownership consistently falls
over the GFC period (Table 3).

•

Board independence is positively significant for ‘business risk’ (BRDI) in 2007 and 2008; and
‘strategy risk’ (SRDI) and ‘market risk’ (MRDI) in 2008 and 2009.

These Table 4 regression results for risk disclosure categories only partially support agency
theory tenets (H1, H2 and H4 are only partially accepted whereas H3 is clearly rejected). The
predictor variables are consistent with the previous studies: company size (Atan and Maruhun 2009;
Kanto and Schadewitz 1997; Beretta and Bozzoland 2004; Linsley and Shrives 2009); and board
independence (Baek et al. 2009; Chen and Jaggi 2000; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Beretta and
Bozzoland 2004; Garcia-Meca and Sanches-Ballesta 2010). Managerial ownership shows no
influence – rather, the overwhelming predictor is a firm’s country of ownership. Thus each
country’s business practices and societal expectations may be the key driving factors.
Conclusion
This study seeks to explain the categories of voluntary risk disclosure (business risk, strategy risk,
operating risk, market risk and credit risk disclosure) over the turbulent Global Financial Crisis time
period of 2007-2009. For the sub-categories of risk disclosures, business risk disclosure is the
highest sub-category of risk over time, while strategy risk is consistently far lower (Table 1). For
operating risk, market risk and strategy risk sub-categories, the highest disclosure levels occur in
2008 (the worst year of the crisis impact on companies). Yet for business risk and credit risk items,
the highest communication is in 2009 (the year of crisis recovery). This implies that the increase of
risk disclosure in the later years of the crisis in 2008 and 2009 reduces estimation risk to better
avoid market failure and increase market liquidity leading to more efficient capital markets (Healy
and Palepu 2001).
Business and credit risk disclosures rise over the three GFC years. However, operating,
market and strategy risk disclosures show a different trend with each of them increasing in 2008 but
then falling slightly in 2009 (see Figure 1). It is surmised that the business and strategy risk steady
rises is because these issues are seen to be critically vital to the organisation's success and are thus
highlighted during the economic crisis period. In contrast, operating, market and strategy risks may
be perceived as being more ‘competitor-sensitive’ and thus extra communication of these issues
may be more contingent on senior managers’ perception of the depth of the crisis. As economic
concerns begin to ease in 2009, the level of transparency begins to fall down to levels perhaps more
comfortably in the manager's equilibrium range.
The regression analysis shows that the country, size and board independence variables
partially help explain the extent of risk disclosures. The first finding is that different countries
disclose differently. One plausible explanation is that the different response based on varying levels
of economic development is related to the acceptance of risk information by shareholders in each
country (Marshall and Weetman 2002). Secondly, bigger firms disclose more risk disclosure data.
These firms are assumed to have stronger financial resources to cover the cost of communicating
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information voluntarily. Disclosure can reduce monitoring costs as part of agency costs by
minimising the capacity of managers to adjust disclosure data (Marshall and Weetman 2002).
Therefore, big manufacturing firms that have more complex operations will better incorporate
monitoring activities to reduce asymmetry information. Thirdly, firms with better corporate
governance systems at times communicate more risk information. Greater presence of independent
directors within the company can positively affect the risk disclosure levels (Beretta and Bozzoland
2004). Arguably, independent directors have less personal interests which allow them to press for
better communication to the shareholders about risk information. In addition, independent directors
have incentives to exercise their decision control to maintain reputational capital. Finally,
managerial ownership does not influence the level of risk disclosure. Managers in these firms
lowered their ownership steadily over the study period and thus may be a lesser influence (Table 3).
Overall, this study finds that there are varying levels of risk disclosure categories over time
and across countries, and such communication is partially influenced by key firm characteristics and
economic drivers mostly in line with agency theory tenets.
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Table 4
Result of Full Regressions of 5 RDI factors
SRDI
07
0.410

Size

BRDI
07
0.001
*
0.001
*

Man
Own

(-)
0.448

Board
Ind

Cty

Lev
Profit
Audit
Age
Adj R
Square

ORDI
07
0.002
*
(-)
0.963

MRDI
07
0.485

(-)
0.671

(-)
0.173

0.003
*

0.532

(-)
0.005
*
0.989

(-)
0.806

0.944

CRDI
07
0.005
*
0.431

BRDI
08
0.187

SRDI
08
(-)
0.815
0.350

ORDI
08
0.002
*
0.443

MRDI
08
0.584

0.274

(-)
0.290

0.862

0.942

0.928

0.646

0.703

0.505

0.007
*

0.008
*

(-)
0.073
***
0.557

(-)
0.432

(-)
0.794

0.170

(-)
0.927
(-)
0.902
(-)
0.523
4.9%

(-)
0.021
**
0.672

0.394

0.446

0.730

0.688
21.5%

0.207

0.669

0.016
**
0.705

0.696

0.291

0.347

(-)
0.619
0.654

31.9%

12.4%

16.6%

12.9%

0.004
*

CRDI
08
0.037
**
0.324

BRDI
09
0.006
*
0.016
**

SRDI
09
0.815

ORDI
09
0.012
**
(-)
0.666

MRDI
09
0.154

0.289

0.350

(-)
0.888

0.163

(-)
0.569

0.712

0.679

0.716

0.027
**

0.870

0.198

0.092
***

(-)
0.768

0.029
**

0.549

(-)
0.741

0.150

(-)
0.101

(-)
0.934

(-)
0.205

(-)
0.585

(-)
0.450

0.032
**

(-)
0.613

0.180

0.397

0.072
***
0.031
**
0.534

(-)
0.836
(-)
0.718
0.140

0.148

0.167

0.753

0.399

0.158

(-)
0.887
0.676

0.488

0.386

0.490

(-)
0.964
0.648

0.552

0.851

0.431

0.500

0.175

0.327

10.8%

17.5%

10.9%

1.7%

15.5%

3.1%

6.7%

12.1%

4.7%

0.077
***

Legend: *Highly significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 10 % level, n = 168 (180 – 12 outliers).
BRDI: Business Risk Disclosure, SRDI: Strategy Risk Disclosure, ORDI: Operating Risk Disclosure, MRDI: Market Risk Disclosure, CRDI: Credit Risk Disclosure.
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0.202

0.082
***

CRDI
09
0.083
***
0.292
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